Distance and national borders are a big hurdle to the expansion of cross-border trade. Further constraints on integration come from heterogeneity in culture and institutions and from the forces of geography, defined as continents and oceans. Of the three sets of factors, the forces of geography are the most potent on integration. Continents act as 'natural' integrators and oceans as common water border. Countries in the same continent trade a quarter more than those located in different continents; and countries sharing the same ocean trade a half more than those that do not have a common water border. A certain degree of substitution exists between the effects on trade of continents and regional trade agreements (RTAs). This substitution is most evident in the presence of political blocs like the Soviet Union. With an active political bloc, the continent loses some of its integration property, leaving more room for the sub-continental RTA to enhance trade. When the political bloc withers away, on the other hand, the continent rises as an integration force relative to the RTA.
The Limits of Integration

I. Introduction
According to much of the academic, business and policy communities, globalization appears to best describe today's economic environment in the world. In a loose sense, globalization means that international trade is not choked by man-made restrictions and that most countries exploit and gain from cross-border transactions. In a strict sense, globalization implies that transactions among residents of distant countries are just as likely and intense as transactions among residents of neighboring countries or among residents of communities located inside a country. The facts are clearly more consistent with the loose concept of globalization than with the strict one. International trade is far from being perfectly globalized. Consumption retains a strong domestic bias and multinational corporations, the big engine of much trade and foreign direct investment, do not have a global reach, but rather focus their activities within an area surrounding the home market; see, for example, Rugman (2005) , Fratianni (2006) and Fratianni and Oh (2009 forthcoming) . Using the looser perspective, it is better to characterize economic environments by degrees of globalization.
Even a cursory reading of history suggests that globalization is not a constant but a time seires with its ups and downs; see Findlay and O'Rourke (2007) . Globalization rises in times of relative peace, especially if peace is "enforced" by a hegemonic power. During the Pax Romana of the first and second century AD trade in goods but also movements of factors -predominantly slaves-thrived in the territories controlled by Rome. The Mongol Empire, between 1250 and 1350, achieved a high degree (for the time) of globalization in Euroasia. Under the British Empire in the 19th century and all the way up to WW I, international commerce and capital mobility reached a higher point. The inter-war years were instead a period of sharp de-globalization. Globalization resumed after WWII, under the Pax Americana, and climbed to even higher grounds in the latter part of the 20th century and the first few years of the 21st century. From 1980 to 2005, total real exports have grown considerably faster, on average, than the world real GDP.
With this background, we can now state the purpose of our paper. Given the existing regime of globalization -a regime that can be influenced by a myriad of political, economic and social factors (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007, especially ch. 10 )-what are the limits to further integration?
What factors, conditional on the existing trade regime, constrain the expansion of cross-border transactions: heterogeneous culture and institutions, or the forces of geography? By culture, we mean affinity due to shared values and history; a common language being the obvious example. By institutions, we mean man-made arrangements that are potentially trade enhancing; a regional trade agreement (RTA) being the obvious example. By geography, we mean the endowments of nature, such as continents and oceans.
Our main conclusion is that, while heterogeneity in culture and institutions pose limits to further integration, the forces of geography are the most potent. Continents act as 'natural' integrators and oceans as common water border. Countries in the same continent trade a quarter more than those located in different continents; and countries sharing the same ocean trade a half more than those that do not have a common water border. A certain degree of substitution exists between the effects on trade of continents and RTAs. This substitution is most evident in the presence of political blocs like the Soviet Union. With an active political bloc, the continent loses some its integration property, leaving more room for the sub-continental RTA to enhance trade.
When the political bloc withers away, on the other hand, the continent rises as an integration force relative to the RTA.
The rest of the paper is organized in five sections. We begin by discussing the significance of geography, culture and institutions in international trade in Section II. In Section III, we develop the gravity equation methodology, which is the engine of our empirical work. Section IV is devoted to data. Findings are analyzed in Section V. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
II. Trade costs, culture, geography and institutions
In the literature on international trade, transportation costs are the most important trade-reducing factor. Krugman (1980) , the leader of the 'new economic geography,' develops a monopolistic competition model with economies of scale in production, zero costs of product differentiation, and 'iceberg-type' transportation costs. In this model, there are two incentives for production agglomeration. The first is that concentration achieves production scale economies. The second is that transportation costs are minimized by the firm locating near the largest market. The upshot is that countries with dissimilar tastes will specialize in industries with relatively larger domestic market and that a country will be a net exporter of the product in which it specializes. Relaxing the assumption of symmetry between countries (and firms), the core-periphery model can be extended to heterogeneous areas (Krugman 1991) . 1 The interaction of transportation costs with scale economies in production remains critical. For Summers (1991) , geographical proximity is the dominant explanation for the high concentration ratios in trade. Not surprisingly, geography, transportation costs, and agglomeration play a key role in many international trade models; see, for example, Venables (1996 Venables ( , 2005 and Martin and Ottaviano (2001) .
Despite their importance, it is difficult to measure directly transportation costs (Hummels 2001) . A popular proxy of such costs is the physical distance separating trade partners. But while it is true that transportation costs rise with distance, there are other unobservable trade costs (TC) that are affected by distance, such as cultural affinities and common institutions. A common language is the obvious example of cultural affinity. It is trade enhancing because it fosters "a greater sharing of literature, radio and television communications, and even educational exchanges, and with all of these come grater knowledge of institutions, networks and individuals of a sort likely to forge tighter economic ties" (Helliwell 1997, p. 175) . Hutchinson (2002) finds a strong impact of language on trade, in particular when the second language is English. Melitz (2008) refines the use of a common language by distinguishing between ease to communicate through translation and outright ability to communicate directly. While the latter appears to be the more cost-reducing and thus more trade enhancing, the former plays a role as well. In fact, both of them do better in explaining bilateral trade than either. Shared religion, like language, is a type of cultural affinity that tends to boost trade (Kang and Fratianni 2006) .
Beyond language and religion, countries with common colonial roots trade with each other more than twice as much as countries without such roots (Rauch 1999) . Immigration is a vehicle to foster affinities and consequently trade between the host and the home country (Gould 1994; Head and Ries 1998 Money is a cost-reducing institution. Countries that share the same money are expected to trade more than countries that have different monies. Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose (2002) have questioned the traditional direction of causality from "real" integration to monetary integration and have proposed instead the opposite hypothesis of monetary unification enhancing economic integration, not only through a higher degree of price transparency and lower transaction costs, but also through more predictable costs and product differentiation. Rose (2000) found that countries that share the same money trade 235 per cent more than countries that do not share the same currency; see also Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and Frankel and Rose (2002) . This finding is controversial, not so much on the 'quality' of the prediction as to its extremely large quantitative impact on bilateral trade. Furthermore, monetary unions are not driven exclusively by trade consideration, as the history of monetary unification well attests.
In addition to national borders, we have regional borders defined by RTAs. The latter, while they have existed since the middle of the 19 th century as an offspring of colonialism, have proliferated over the last two decades; see, for example, Panagariya (2000) and Fratianni and Pattison (2001) . 2 The traditional question is whether RTAs are "building" or "stumbling" blocs, where "building" refers to the case of expanding world trade and "stumbling" to the case of contracting world trade (Bhagwati 1991; Panagariya 2000, Section 7) . 3 Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find that bilateral trade between members of the same RTA doubles, on average, after a 10-year relative to intra-continental ones, one arrives at the intuitive result that that the continent is an optimal RTA, call it a natural continental bloc. But natural continental blocs can occur even in less extreme situations, an issue that is explored by Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995) who find that for a relatively small values of intercontinental transport costs the creation a natural RTA improves welfare. 5 On the other hand, unnatural RTAs -defined when one country from one continent creates an RTA with a country from another continent-lower welfare for small values of intercontinental costs. 6 The point is that the geography of importer and exporter countries is quite relevant. Recent work has shown a renewed interest on the geography of trade. For example, the latitude of a country --by influencing the length of daylight, strength of sunlight, temperatures and seasons--can also influence differences in factor endowment and, hence, opportunities for profitable trade; for example, Melitz (2007) shows that differences between North and South promote international trade. In addition, large historical evidence underscores the importance of seas and oceans in trade.
The economic fortunes of medieval Italian city-states like Venice and Genoa, Antwerp in the first half of the 16 th century, and Amsterdam and London for much of the 18 th century were derived to no small degree from being maritime trade powers (Braudel 1992; Kindleberger 1996) . The strong trade orientation of Western Europe cannot be divorced from being located on the western rim of Eurasia and being in a position to exploit "the favourable winds and currents" of the Atlantic ocean; generates trade creation as well as trade diversion. The former comes from the decline in trade with countries that have moved out to create the new bloc. The latter comes from an expansion of trade with countries that were already outside the bloc and thus subject to an external tariff. The net effect on welfare is ambiguous. As the number of blocs grows, the representative bloc becomes smaller and most of its trade occurs with outside countries. This expansion of trade dominates the contraction of trade with countries that moved out to create new blocs. The net effect is a rise in welfare. 5 The range of transport costs is comprised between 0 and 1. A natural continental bloc occurs with costs starting at 0.15; see their Fig 2. 6 Frankel et al (1996) carry out several other interesting simulations, which are beyond the focus of this paper.
the advantages derived from having ready access to land or sea routes (Venables 2005, p. 3).
Conversely, being landlocked implies high transportation costs: Raballand (2003) see also Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) .
In the rest of the paper we test what are the limits to integration. Our main finding is that culture, geography, and institutions matter but geography matters the most. Our research strategy is to estimate GE using bilateral trade flows between 141 countries and compare the relevant strengths of culture, geography and institutions as trade-enhancing factors. Continental perimeters act like a super-border that hinders inter-continental transactions, while facilitating intra-continental ones. On the contrary, oceans are viewed as common water borders similar to common land borders.
II. The Gravity Equation Model
The GE is the workhorse of empirical analysis in international trade. It is typically used to explain cross-sectional variation in country pairs' trade flows in terms of the countries' incomes, bilateral distance, and dummy variables for trade-enhancing factors. There is an obvious parallelism between GE used in physics and GE used in international trade: countries' incomes act as centripetal forces and physical distance separating the countries as a centrifugal force. However, unlike Newton's universal gravity constant, in the trade GE there is an "un-constant" due to different forces at work.
Considerable advances have occurred in the last three decades in providing a respectable theoretical foundation to the GE. Here, we shall mention only a few references. 7 At the end of the seventies, Anderson (1979) , relying on the assumption of goods differentiated by country of origin and complete specialization (Armington 1969) , derives a simple GE from a linear expenditure system in which the preferences for a country's good are assumed to be homothetic and uniform 7 See Fratianni (2009) for the development of the GE in international trade.
across importing countries. A few years later, Bergstrand (1985) , also starting from complete specialization and identical consumers' preferences, develops what he calls a generalized GE that includes distance, as proxy for shipping costs, and price terms. Helpman (1987) , drawing on his work with Krugman (Helpman and Krugman 1985, ch. 8) , generates a GE that addresses the important issue of intra-industry trade, the key testable implication being that intra-industry trade responds positively, not only to the level of aggregate income, but also to the degree of income similarity among trading partners. Deardorff (1998) shows that the GE can be derived from several models. Finally, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) The bronze medal goes for using real GDPs, as opposed to nominal GDPs. In this case, the multilateral TC factors are not well identified and the model errors fail to be orthogonal to the regressors, with the consequence that the OLS estimator is asymptotically downward biased.
Further problems arise also from differences among price deflators (traded and non-traded goods) and price indices of traded goods. A more serious error, for which a silver medal is assigned, goes for employing two-way bilateral trade. Since the GE is a modified expenditure function with a market-clearing condition, the theory explains only one-way bilateral trade and not two-way trade.
This error leads to an overestimate of bilateral trade and larger error variance, which is particularly severe in panel data. Finally, the gravest error, for which the gold medal is assigned, occurs when the multilateral resistance factor are omitted altogether. Following Rose and van Wincoop (2001) , Feenstra (2003) , and Cheng and Wall (2003) , Baldwin and Taglioni propose country dummies in cross-section data and country-pair FE in panel data to avoid the gold medal error. However, country-pair dummies (simply, pair dummies) are time-invariant and consequently are only part of the answer; serial correlation remains. It should be added that pair dummies capture all FE, including distance elasticity, making it impossible to distinguish among parameters of various timeinvariant variables. The alternative is provided by Carrère (2006) who shows the merit of modelling pair dummies as random variables (RE, henceforth); in sum, employing RE pair dummies one can dodge the gold medal bullet and yet estimate the impact of distance on trade.
Having addressed some of the econometric issues, we can proceed with the further specification of (1). We concentrate on trade-enhancing factors. In the base version of the GE, TCs COLONIZER, and COLONY that assume a value of one when i and j share, respectively, the same main language, had a common colonizer in the past, or were involved in a colonial relationship with each other; otherwise the dummies are equal to zero. INSTITUTIONS, as well, consists of three dummies: BORDER, MONEY and RTA that assume a value of one when the country pair share, respectively, a common land border, the same currency, and are members of the same RTA; otherwise, the dummies are zero. Finally, GEOGRAPHY includes the dummies CONTINENT and OCEAN that acquire a value of unity when the country pair, respectively, belong to the same continent and share the same ocean; otherwise the dummies are equal to zero. Note that whereas cultural and institutional dummies can vary over time, geography is constant.
We achieve a testable GE as follows. First, we substitute (2) in (1) and apply a logarithmic transformation that yields a GE that is similar to Anderson and van Wincops's (2003) , where μ t is a year dummy and ε ijt is an idiosyncratic error. Secondly, we specify cultural, institutional and geographical factors according to the eight dummy variables previously described. Our testable GE is as follows:
Bilateral distance elasticity
is negative since the elasticity of substitution σ is larger than unity. The three cultural semi-elasticities
, BORDER has been consistently estimated as being positive, while the findings for MONEY and RTA have been mixed. One reason is that an RTAs may be a step towards a monetary union, making the two institutions highly collinear (Panagariya 2000) . Another reason is that RTA generate significant trade-diversion (Carrère 2006) . A third reason is that RTAs, while contributing to bilateral trade flows initially, expand beyond their optimal size (Fratianni and Oh 2009) . A careful examination of these issues is beyond the scope of our study. 8 The two geographical semi-elasticities
are expected to be positive.
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data set consists of 215,500 annual observations covering 143 countries over the period 1980 to [Insert Table 1 ANDEAN and NAFTA in 1988-1989; CACM and MERCOSUR in 1991-1992 
IV. Results
Methodology
All our panel estimates use a cluster correction for country pairs and robust standard errors. The former reduces potential pair serial correlation and the latter corrects for potential heteroschedasticity. Exports and country incomes are expressed in logarithms of nominal U.S.
dollars and thus avoid one of the medals in the Baldwin-Taglioni (2006) mistake race. country pairs that are 10 per cent more distant trade 12 percent less. The second, One-way GE, adds year dummies to the Core GE. The third, Three-way GE, adds importer country and exporter country dummies to control for the atheoritical remoteness (Egger 2000) . The last two models address the issue of multilateral resistance. In Pair FE, we use country-pair fixed effects, in addition to year dummies (Baier and Bergstrand 2009) . In Pair RE, we use country-pair random effects, in addition to year and country dummies (Carrère 2006) .
[Insert In sum, we consider the Pair RE GE our best estimate, which yields a very statistically significant and strong economic effect of distance on trade. The high R 2 =0.68 is comparable to that of the Three-way GE.
Findings
Having established our best econometric method, we now proceed with the estimates of equation (4), which adds trade-enhancing factors to the Base gravity equation (3). [Insert Table 3 here] Culture has a significant economic impact on bilateral trade flows: trade is approximately 2.6 times larger when country partners are involved in a colonial relationship; 66 percent higher when exporter and importer country have had a common past colonize; and more than 45 percent when they share a common main language. 12 However, the economic impact of shared characteristics at the world level must take into account of the incidence of the phenomenon. In this sense, common language is the most pervasive cultural affinity since it affects 21.4 percent of bilateral trade flows; see Table 1 .
Another important trade-enhancing factor are institutions. The semi-elasticities of BORDER, MONEY, and RTA are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, except for MONEY which is significant at the 5 percent level. The impact on trade of a common land border (0.47) is more than twice than of a common RTA (0.21), which, in turn, is half as great that of a common currency (0.14). If one adds the incidence of institutions at the world level, the relative importance of MONEY is further diminished by the fact that less than one percent of all bilateral trade flows share the property of a common currency; again, see Table 1 .
Geography as well is a key driver of trade. A common water border raises trade by 54 percent. In contrast, a common land border raises trade by 74 percent. Given the higher incidence of intra-continental trade, a common land border has a higher overall impact on trade a common water border. The opposite is true in the comparison between CONTINENT and RTA; here, geography has an edge over the institution of RTAs; more on this below. Finally, it should be noted that three sets of trade-enhancing factors soak a 'fair' portion of the trade-reducing effects of distance: the distance elasticity in Table 3 drops by about one quarter with respect to the estimate of Table 2 .
The left-hand panel of Figure 1 summarizes graphically the impact on average bilateral flows of the trade-enhancing factors. These are measured by 1 − −elasticity semi e . Cultural affinities exert 12 We calculate the economic impact of CULTURE as follows: 2.596 = e 1.28 -1 for COLONY, 0.656 = e 0.505 -1 for COLONIZER, and 0.455 = e 0.375 -1 for LANGUAGE.
the strongest force on bilateral flows. However, the size of the economic impact and the relative ranking of the three sets of variables change sharply when we consider their influence at the world level. In Figure 2 , we multiply the semi-elasticities by their respective average export weights; for example, the export weight for common language is the average share of trade flows between countries sharing the same language as a proportion of the sum of all bilateral trade flows. Seen from an aggregate perspective, OCEAN heads, by a big margin, the list of trade-enhancing factors, followed by BORDER, CONTINENT, LANGUAGE, COLONY, RTA, COLONIZER and in the last place MONEY. Geography, as the sum of oceans and continents, is the biggest driver to world integration. Cultural affinities and institutions are roughly comparable.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
Political events, such as the breakup of Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1992 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in1991, could have affected materially our empirical findings for at least three reasons. 13 The first is that the number of bilateral trade flows rises. The second is that the creation of new countries changed the distribution of trade-enhancing factors, the obvious example being the frequency of BORDER. The third is the demise of conflicting blocs in Europe spurred new bilateral trade flows that were previously impossible. To address the issue of a structural break, we break up our sample in pre and post 1991. The regressions of the two sub-samples are shown in the last two columns of Table 3 .
In the pre-1991 sub-period, continents are less important -in terms of the size of the relevant semi-elasticity--than a common RTA, which, in turn, is less important than shared money.
Common land border and common water border have the same economic impact on bilateral trade flows. Seen from the country-pair perspective, institutions are more trade enhancing than geography. The ranking is reversed in the second sub-period, except for BORDER. In particular,
OCEAN and CONTINENT semi-elasticities are, respectively, 47 and 36 percent higher than the 13 To these two events we should mention German reunification in October of 1990. However, this event, while relevant for East and West Germany, had modest secondary consequences on the rest of the world.
RTA semi-elasticity; see second and third panels of Figure 1 . The impact of geography comes out even stronger at the world level; see second and third panels of Figure 2 . In the post-1991 period, the two geography semi-elasticities add up to 47 percent against the 22 percent of the three institutional semi-elasticities. The biggest change involves CONTINENT that moves up from 5.7 to 17.9 percent. The inference is that the noted political disintegration of 1991-92 has left a mark of trade patterns.
RTAs and geography
We try to gain additional insights on the significance of the 1991 structural break by allowing heterogeneity in RTAs, continents, and oceans; see Table 4 . In the first column of this table we add the eleven RTAs, in addition to culture and other institutions. The highest RTA semi-elasticities are those of SPARTECA (1.25) and PATCRA (0. [Insert Table 4 here]
In column two we add the six continents and the four oceans to the separate RTAs. The findings appear consistent with continents being natural blocs. With the exception of Europe, intracontinental trade is higher than inter-continental one: 15 percent more in Asia, 70 percent more in South America, 140 percent more in North America, and fifteen times more in Oceania. Moreover, continents soak up some of the RTA effects.
14 About oceans, the Indian ocean raises trade by a factor of two, the Mediterranean by two thirds; the Pacific by 45 percent, and the Atlantic by a third. Our prior was that the coefficients of the ocean dummies would be smaller than the coefficients of BORDER because of the higher heterogeneity of overseas countries. The findings are more mixed. The BORDER semi-elasticity is twice the ATLANTIC's, half as large as the PACIFIC's, close to the MEDITERRANEAN's and lower than the INDIAN's. In sum, the effect of continents and oceans on trade is on average larger than that of RTA and BORDER. Broadly speaking, geography beats institutions.
One apparently odd result is the negative effect on trade of the European continent. Two possible reasons come to mind. The first is that Southern European countries face the Mediterranean sea, while Northern countries face the Atlantic ocean, permitting the two water masses to erode the super border effect of the continent. The second is that 'political' blocs, such as the Soviet Union, have exert strong centripetal forces and, as a consequence, generate economic disintegration over the entire continent. To gain some insight on this issue, we resort to sub-sample estimation around the break point of 1991; see last two columns of Table 4 . A few examples may be useful on the economic significance of common institutions and geography. We start with the pair France and Italy, two coastal countries with a common land border, members of the same RTA, and since 1998 sharing a common currency. In pre-1991 period, 
V. Conclusions
This paper has tried to answer the following question: Given the political and social factors that We concentrated on three trade-enhancing factors: cultural affinities, common institutions and geographical characteristics. The extent of heterogeneity in culture and institutions represent clearly a limit to integration. But geography as well acts as a limit to integration. In fact, geography poses a greater constraint on integration than cultural affinities and common institutions. In particular, continents act as 'natural' integrators and oceans as common water border. Countries located in the same continent trade a quarter more than those located in different continents;
countries sharing the same ocean trade a half more than those that do not have a common water border.
Our results are in line with the literature on natural blocs; see Krugman (1993 ), Frankel, Stein, Wei (1995 ), and Frankel (1997 . We find some evidence that continents act like super RTAs with their own borders. Continents enter into conflict with 'political' blocs; this is the experience of Europe with the Soviet Union. With an active political bloc, the continent loses some its integration property, leaving more room for the sub-continental RTA to enhance trade. On the contrary, with an inactive political bloc, the continent rises as an integration force relative to the RTA. Thus, to some degree, continents and RTAs are substitutes.
Finally, oceans facilitate trade between distant countries, a result that agrees with the literature on landlocked countries and with long historical evidence. Countries sharing the same ocean trade twice as much as countries located in the same continent. Oceans stretch the reach of continents, suggesting that 'natural' RTAs should form more around an ocean than within a continent. 1980-2003 1980-2003 1980-2003 1980-1991 1992-2003 Period: 1980 Period: -2003 Period: 1980 Period: -2003 Period: 1980 Period: -1991 Period: 1992 Period: -2003 COEFFICIENT (1 Semi-elasticity*Proportion -1. Semi-elasticities come from columns (3), (4), and (5) of Table 3 . Proportion is the mean value of the dummy (see Table 1 for the 1980-2003 period) .
